Sunday, March 26, 2017

Marriage and gender gaps in presidential elections since 1968

Steve Sailer has been pointing out since at least the 2004 presidential election that the marriage gap is a bigger deal than the much more media salient gender gap. The GSS reveals that Steve's perspicacity has been descriptive extending much farther back than that, since at least 1968.

Parenthetically, this is often the case with Steve's insights. He's portrayed as an extremist by all the usual suspects even though his observations tend to be quite modest and parsimonious given the data--both quantitative and qualitative--he bases those observations on.

The following graph shows the marriage and gender gaps, in black and red respectively, by presidential election. The marriage gap values are computed by taking the Republican candidate's performance in a two-way race among unmarried voters and subtracting it from his performance among married voters. The gender gap values are computed by taking the Republican candidate's performance in a two-way race among female voters and subtracting it from his performance among male voters:

The GSS asks about each presidential election for no more than seven years--three or four survey iterations, as they're conducted every couple of years on average--after that election occurs. So the 1988 election between the elder Bush and Dukakis gets a question in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1993. Since these responses are being cross-referenced with marital status at the time of survey participation, there's going to be a little noise in the marital status figures. Someone responding in 1993, who may have been single when he voted for Dukakis in 1988 but who married in the interim, will show up as a married who voted Democrat even though he was unmarried when he actually voted.

This will modestly understate the real size of the marriage gap in each election while leaving the gender gap untouched (excepting the handful of trannies who may be hiding in the data sets!). Consequently, the difference in magnitude between the marriage gap and the gender gap is modestly greater than what is depicted in the graph above.

We can thus confidently conclude that in every US presidential election going back to at least Humphrey and Nixon in 1968 the marriage gap has been wider than the gender gap has been.

GSS variables used: PRES68(1-2), PRES72(1-2), PRES76(1-2), PRES80(1-2), PRES84(1-2), PRES88(1-2), PRES92(1-2), PRES96(1-2), PRES00(1-2), PRES04(1-2), PRES08(1-2), PRES12(1-2), MARITAL(1)(3-5), SEX

Saturday, March 25, 2017

A couple more polling stragglers

- Multiple people have balked at Trump's apparent Mormon support. This comment at Heartiste's is illustrative:
45.5% of Utahns voted for Trump, but you’re claiming that 72% of Mormons voted for Trump? Sorry, but those results don’t line up. There’s definitely some sampling error in there.
Keep in mind the results were in the context of a two-way race. Evan McMullin, the Mormon who was futilely pushed by cuckservatives in a ridiculously far-fetched attempt to send the election to the House of representatives, sucked up a lot of Mormon support. He got 21.5% of the vote in Utah. If we back this out and just compare Trump vs Hillary, we see that Trump crushed her, 62.4%-37.6%.

One-third of Utah's population isn't Mormon. Given that Mormons are the most reliably Republican demographic in the country, it's probably reasonable to assume that Utah's non-Mormon population was less likely to vote for Trump than its Mormons were. If we estimate non-Mormons in Utah went 50/50 for Trump/Hillary, we get a Mormon Utahan result of 68.6%-31.4% in Trump's favor, close to the Reuters-Ipsos result of 71.6%-28.4% among Mormons nationwide.

While Utah is majority-Mormon, the majority of America's Mormons do not live in Utah. Of the 6.5 million Mormons in the US, 2 million live in Utah. Since most McMullin voters, if forced to choose between Trump and Hillary likely would have gone with Trump, it's reasonable to assume that relative to Mormons in Utah, non-Utahan Mormons in states where McMullin wasn't on the the ballot--like California, which has the second-largest population of Mormons in the country after Utah--were more likely to vote for Trump than for Hillary.

So if Mormons outside of Utah went for Trump 73%-27% in a two-way contest with Hillary--which seems quite plausible--we'd be exactly in line with the R-I result.

- Similarly, there have been assertions that the marriage gap is actually just a disguised age gap. Again, from a commenter at Heartiste's:
If you had broken all your groups down by age, you’d find that young white women are more likely to be single and that single white manginas who voted for thecunt were…young!
Age is positively correlated with the likelihood of being married, but the marriage gap is present within age cohorts (at least among women). Among whites under 35, Trump's support among whites breaks down as follows:

Young single white men were marginally more supportive of Trump than young married white men were, though the difference is within the margin of error. The difference between young single and young married white women, however, is yuge.

Now let's look at whites aged 35-65 (beyond 65 we start running into widow confounding):

Here, too, the marriage gap is more of a chasm among women.

We might want to refine our focus on the marriage gap to an emphasis on the female marriage gap in particular.

Note too that age isn't much of a factor here. Younger and older single white women vote pretty much the same, as do younger and older married white women, etc. Among whites, it's mostly single women on one side and everyone else on the other.

Wednesday, March 22, 2017

Fight the invasion

I found this flier near a construction site this morning:

Google translates as follows:

High to deportations!

Sunday, March 26, 2017/4 PM - 6 PM Church Our Savior Lutheran Church KC 4153 Rainbow Blvd, Kansas City, Kansas 65103

A KC Fight invites you to a conversation with immigration experts, they can answer your questions to create plans of action and resistance. There will be music in LIVE!

Food on sale to raise funds for Johnathan and Andres; Who were unjustly arrested in the protest 'A Day Without Immigrants.'

Doesn't helping scofflaws and their sympathizers create plans of "action and resistance" against a federal agency carrying out a legally mandated function constitute the aiding and abetting of illegal activity?

Let's see if we can move ICE to take a look at this civilizationally seditious gathering. Here's the ICE tip form page. For selected violation, I chose "human smuggling" and for who the complaint involves, I selected "business/company" and entered the church's information a second time.

In the summary box I put "I have been tipped off to a meeting this Sunday, March 26th from 4pm-6pm at the address above that will feature advice on how to take action against ICE and help illegal immigrants avoid deportation. The people planning this are aiding and abetting illegal activity and their audience will be illegal immigrants and those assisting them."

If you'd prefer to call, ICE's toll-free phone line is (866) 347-2423.

Here is the homepage of the church hosting the invaders, and here is the email address of organizers:

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

Miscellany of exit polling items

If you haven't, see Steve Sailer's and Heartiste's reactions to the Reuters-Ipsos detailed exit poll data.

First, Heartiste notes a commenter at Steve's pointing out what I should've emphasized:
Which of these things is not like the others?

Single white women: 39.0
Married white women: 61.4
Single white men: 59.0
Married white men: 61.0
A couple of clarifying comments. Steve's subsequent post looked at work from professor George Hawley who asserted that "the relationship between marriage and voting declined" in 2016 from 2012.

Maybe--Trump was more Fishtown and less Belmont than Romney--but the correlation he looks at is at the state level, not at the level of individual voter. I've not run the numbers, but I suspect that at the state level the relationship between IQ and voting Republican increased between 2012 and 2016. The upper Midwest states, where Trump outperformed Romney the most, do pretty well on measures of intelligence.

Given Trump's much stronger performance with working-class whites, modestly stronger performance with non-whites, and poorer performance with professional whites relative to Romney's, however, it's almost certain that the average IQ of Republican voters decreased between 2012 and 2016 even though the average IQ of the states that went for Trump was higher than the average IQ of states that went for Romney (clever sillies aren't going to save the West, Alt Knights will).

The officially commissioned exit poll released on election night shows a marriage gap that is narrower than what the R-I results show. I wish I'd saved all the initial releases on November 9th. I did happen to screen shot a few in the course of doing a little post-election analysis before they were changed again and again and again, presumably to adjust to official electoral results as those trickled in for several weeks after the election. Of the four exit poll tables captured in this post from November 12th, the results for every single one subsequently changed.

In other words, there's reason to be skeptical of the commissioned exit poll. In any event, R-I's results provide another similar but not identical data set.

Heartiste, pointing out Trump's strong performance among married Jewish men, cautions that this might more accurately be described as a strong performance among married Orthodox Jewish men on the presumption that a lot of secular, irreligious ethnic Jews identify as having "no religion" rather than "Jewish".

It's hard to know how things shake out precisely from survey to survey, but the GSS--when asking "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?"--shows that only 36.1% of those who identify as Jewish say they "know God exists". The corresponding figures for Protestants and Catholics are 74.9% and 62.2%, respectively.

In other words, barely one-third of self-described Jews--self-described in response to a question about religion rather than ethnicity or cultural heritage, no less--are firm theists. Some number of secular ethnic Jews do not identify with any religious tradition, but a not insubstantial number of them--the majority if I had to guess--identify as Jewish.

GSS variables used: RELIG(1,2,3), YEAR(2000-2014), GOD(6)

Monday, March 20, 2017

The future belongs to those who show up for it

From the GSS, responses from white survey participants on the ideal number of children for a household to have, by year of participation in the survey:

Even as our TFR has been sub-replacement, our collective assessment of what we should be doing hasn't changed. We know replacement should be the floor. Fewer than 1-in-20 white Americans put the ideal number of children to have at 0 or 1.

Knowledge isn't enough, though, in this case or any other. We all have 10,000 Library of Alexandrias in our butt pockets. The sum of all human knowledge is 0.91 seconds away. Only when knowledge is put into practice does it become functional.

What we lack is the will. For more than a generation now the native populations of every Western nation--excepting Israel, if it is included as part of the Occident--have been failing to replace themselves.

This first manifests as an upward shift in the median age as the leading low-fertility generation grays. The total population doesn't actually start declining until that low-fertility generation begins dying off. It's already happening in Japan, and it will happen here when the Boomers check out.

It's not just that the populations in "refugee" sending countries are numerous, it's that even if their fertility fell to Western levels overnight, their populations would continue to grow for several decades.

Here are the median ages of populations in several refugee-sending countries:

Syria -- 24
Iraq -- 20
Chad -- 18
South Sudan -- 17
The Congo -- 20
Nigeria -- 18
Somalia -- 18
Yemen -- 19

Compare that to the geriatric West:

Germany -- 47
France -- 41 (the figure for the 10%+ of the population that is Muslim is significantly lower)
Italy -- 45
Great Britain -- 41
Sweden -- 41
The US -- 38

Increasing our birth rates is not sufficient to save Western civilization, but it is necessary. The future belongs to those who show up for it.

There are three actionable, conceivable things to do in the US (and Europe) to preserve ourselves and our posterity:

1) A moratorium on immigration (more politically palatable than preferential status for selected ancestrally and culturally compatible countries)

2) The repatriation of non-citizens ("you have to go back")

3) An increase in native fertility (an uptick of 25% would do the trick)

These are achievable. While we still have some ground to cover to get to 1) and 2), we're much closer today than we were even two years ago.

I'm anecdotal evidence for 3). My wife and I have two kids, aged 3 and 1, and we're not finished yet. My decision to start a family was spurred in large part by a sense of civilizational and ancestral duty. I was set to be a ZFG--zero fecundities given--genetic dead end through my mid-twenties, including the first few years of this blog. After a couple of years hovering in the seminal mists of the Dark Enlightenment--roughly the precursor to the Alt Right--it became clear to me that sitting on the sidelines was no longer an option.

Those who forget about their ancestors soon forget about their descendants.

Parenthetically, here's suggestive evidence that choosing cats over kids isn't something childless post-menopausal women are satisfied with having done:

Childless women over the age of 60 (n = 679) put the ideal number of children to have at 2.75 on average!

GSS variables used: CHLDIDEL(0-7), AGE(60-89), SEX, RACE(1), YEAR, BORN(1), CHILDS(0)